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In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) held a conference whose proceedings were subsequently published
under the title The Future of Social Protection (OECD 1981). Emile van Len-
nep, who was then the secretary general of the OECD, specified in his opening
speech what he considered to be "main principles" that should not be placed in
jeopardy by the economic crisis then facing the OECD area (OECD 1981, 10):
1. We must surely continue to build on the principle that adequate in-
come from work is the primary basis of well-being;
2. The State has a clear responsibility, in response to the common will
in democratic societies, to achieve through the fiscal system a more equita-
ble distribution of income than the market system would of itself provide;
3. The State must surely remain as the main guarantor against social
risks such as unemployment, ill-health, disability, and old age—that is to
say, "social security";
4. Transfers to the vulnerable groups in society can be achieved in a
variety of ways: direct transfers involving states, provinces or municipalities;
price subsidies leading to lower consumer prices, for example rents and
transportation; and, of course, various forms of private solidarity.
However, the accompanying secretariat paper (OECD 1981, 73-83) warned
that the inspiration of these ideals—the drive toward a more egalitarian distri-
bution of income—had already started to break down. The "tax revolt" was
calling the viability of some forms of social provision into question. Hence, it
Peter Scherer is head of the Social Affairs and Industrial Relations Division of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The opinions expressed in this chapter are the author's own and do not engage the OECD. He
is grateful for comments and suggestions from Rebecca Blank, Patrick Hennessy, and Bettina
Cass, although he remains responsible for any defects that remain.
4344 Peter Scherer
appeared that some OECD countries were about to reject many of the prin-
ciples which the organization's secretary general had identified as crucial.
A decade later, this rejection has indeed occurred, but it has been less gen-
eral than is often thought. Apart from the United States, only the United King-
dom and (since 1990) New Zealand have rejected the thrust of the principles
van Lennep enunciated as public policy. Although there has been a general
decline in trade union membership in all OECD countries (see OECD 1991),
only in these three countries has collective bargaining been downplayed
and even condemned in public-policy terms. These changes were related: col-
lective determination of employment provisions was generally related to
social arrangements. In fact, in many countries, this was, and is, institution-
alized; many social protection measures, including workers' compensation,
health insurance, and pension provision, are administered by tripartite insti-
tutions.
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2.1 Social Expenditures in the 1980s: The End of Growth
The crisis in the welfare state to which the OECD conference volume title
referred was primarily a fiscal one. Social expenditures had grown at a faster
rate than real national product during the period of rapid growth in per capita
gross domestic product (GDP), which ended in the early 1970s. During the
1970s, the rate of increase in expenditure slowed but not as much as the decline
in economic growth, so that social expenditures continued to rise as a percent-
age of GDP in most OECD countries.
The reasons for this were mixed. Pension systems instituted over the previ-
ous twenty years were maturing so that retirees had accrued more substantial
pension entitlements. Some other items of expenditure, associated with educa-
tion and transfers to families, could be expected to decline in the 1980s.
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However, other pressures seemed likely to continue. In particular, the cost
of health care systems was increasing as a proportion of GDP in all countries
and seemed unstoppable in the light of the development of medical technolog-
ies and the growth in expenditure on incomes of the medical profession. And
the decline in the employment:population ratio in many countries was associ-
ated either with a growth in expenditure on benefits for the openly unemployed
or a growth in other support for those without a job—in particular, disability
pensions and various forms of early retirement pensions.
Public social protection expenditure did continue to increase as a proportion
of GDP until 1983, but since then it has been relatively stable (see fig. 2.1,
1. Less often, but still frequently, they are provided through provisions in multiemployer collec-
tive bargains which are "extended" to all employers potentially covered by the negotiations and
thus become subsidiary legislation. This is particularly significant for some supposedly "private"
supplementary pension provision. See, for example, OECD (1992a, 1993) for discussions of such
arrangements in the Netherlands and Finland.
2. For a discussion of these prospects as they appeared a decade ago, see OECD (1985).45 Trends in Social Protection Programs and Expenditures in the 1980s
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Fig. 2.1 Public expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP in the
United States and the OECD
Source: OECD 1994.
Note: 1960-1980 excludes Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey: 1980-1990
excludes Iceland, Switzerland, and Turkey.
which shows the trend in social expenditures over the past three decades as an
unweighted average of twenty-one OECD countries). Furthermore, this stabil-
ity applies to each of the three components of expenditure into which expendi-
ture data can currently be disaggregated: health care, expenditure on the aged
(predominantly public old-age pensions and related survivors' benefits), and
transfers to the non-aged, which include family allowances and unemployment
benefits, support for single parents, and disability and early retirement pen-
sions.
3 In the case of the United States, a fall since 1983 in expenditure on the
non-aged, associated with the improved labor market situation, was balanced
3. Work continues on developing comprehensive data series for each of these individual compo-
nents of expenditure, but data on a comparative basis are not yet available.46 Peter Scherer
by an increase in public expenditure on health care—an increase reflecting the
general inflation in health care expenditures in the United States.
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However, this apparent stability in the OECD average is the result of a con-
siderable variety in trends and levels across OECD countries (see appendix).
In 1988 (the latest year for which data are available for all the twenty-one
OECD countries included in the data base at the moment), social protection
expenditures as a percentage of GDP range from 11.8 (Japan) and 12.2 (Aus-
tralia) to 28.1 (Norway) and 33.3 (Sweden). The sources of this cross-country
variation are too extensive to discuss in detail here. Variations in public expen-
ditures on health—which range in percentage of GDP from 4.7 (United States)
and 4.9 (Japan) to 7.4 (Norway) and 7.6 (Sweden)—are not the main cause.
Differences in the extent and generosity of public old-age pensions are greater,
and expenditure on the aged varies from 3.8 percent of GDP (Australia) to
14.1 percent (Italy). However, an equally important source of variation lies in
public social protection expenditures for the non-aged, which vary from 2.1
percent of GDP in Japan and 3.2 percent in Australia, to 13.3 percent in Den-
mark and 13.9 percent in Sweden. In general, the countries of Europe fall be-
tween these extremes, with average expenditures in the European Community
for these three components being 5.6, 9.7, and 7.7 percent of GDP, respec-
tively.
The sources of the stability in the overall average since 1983 are mixed.
With the exception of the United States, Iceland, and Finland, OECD countries
generally stabilized public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the
latter part of the 1980s. The maturation of generous public pension systems in
Japan, Italy, and Greece led to a growth in the proportion of GDP transferred
to the aged (particularly in Italy and Greece, where, in contrast to Japan,
changes to the structure of public pensions also increased the expenditure lev-
els). In some other countries, a tightening of means tests for pension provision
(Australia) or a narrowing of entitlement (West Germany and Denmark) led to
a slight reduction in this ratio. Hence, the overall average for this component
increased only very slightly. Transfers to the non-aged were the most volatile,
largely because unemployment benefit payments and other transfers to people
without employment fell as labor market conditions improved during the
decade, while other transfers (particularly various forms of assistance to fami-
lies) increased faster than GDP in the Nordic countries.
Developments over the past decade have established that social protection
expenditures are not, in general, out of control, in the sense that their previous
tendency to increase at a rate greater than GDP has been controlled. However,
this apparent equilibrium is an uneasy one; many countries are experiencing
pressures, such as the following, that could well result in this apparent stability
being only temporary:
4. Unlike all other OECD countries except Turkey, expenditure on health care in the United
States is largely private.47 Trends in Social Protection Programs and Expenditures in the 1980s
• Slowdown in economic growth combined with continuing growth in demand
for health care and a possible growth in income transfers to the unemployed
and other jobless people can result in cyclical increases in expenditures that
can easily become structural.
• Inflationary tendencies in medical services, familiar in the United States
(where they are largely met by private insurance), are also evident in the
rest of the OECD, where public systems bear the financing burden. Such
tendencies are particularly intense in those systems (such as France's) that
are based on fee-for-service reimbursement. Many countries are responding
by introducing or expanding direct contracts between suppliers and public
third-party payers, but others are shifting the burden of some payments to
the private sector by requiring higher copayments for some services. Higher
copayments have also been imposed for pharmaceutical products sold at
prices higher than their generic equivalents.
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• The aging of populations in OECD countries as the postwar "baby boom"
generation retires will threaten the apparent stability in old-age function ex-
penditure. In particular, in a number of southern European countries (Greece,
Italy, Spain, and Portugal), the net replacement rate (the ratio of pension
received to final salary net of taxes and charges) is above 80 percent and is
no lower for those with high salaries than for those with low ones (Eurostat
1993).
These public social protection provisions are, of course, additional to the
systems of employment protection contained in employment laws or in collec-
tive agreements. However, they are closely related. While it is possible to build
up a system of employment regulation without an employment-related social
protection system,
6 this is unusual. Concern for security outside or after the
employment relationship has in most cases led to public underwriting of vari-
ous forms of social insurance—and in particular to the assurance of old-age
pensions that guarantee the replacement of a substantial part of earnings after
retirement.
2.2 Interpreting Differences in Social Protection Arrangements
Recent analytic work in this field (for a brief survey, see Mitchell 1992) has
tried to analyze social protection policies and their outcomes by categorizing
countries into groups: Mishra (1990) uses two ("social corporatist" as in Swe-
den and Austria and "neoconservative" as in the United States and the United
Kingdom), while Esping-Anderson (Esping-Anderson and Micklewright
5. See OECD (1992c) for further discussion of the "internal" reforms of publicly funded health
care systems in seven OECD countries.
6. Australia, with its means-tested approach to public income security, is one example—al-
though the mandating of retirement provisions by employers since 1992 has modified even this
case.48 Peter Scherer
1991) suggests a three-way typology ("liberal residual" as in the United States,
"conservative" as in West Germany, and "social democratic" as in Sweden).
L0demel and Schulte (1992) add a fourth—a "Latin" (i.e., Mediterranean)
group—to complete the typology. This group approach has a certain attraction:
the countries with the highest ratio of GDP to social expenditures fall in the
"social democratic" group, with the "conservative" group intermediate and the
"liberal residual" group the lowest, and "Latin" countries show high expendi-
ture on the aged but not on other functions. However, closer examination of
the patterns and trends suggests that these typologies are not very useful for
explaining expenditure differentials and trends. Most of the significant differ-
ences are due to the presence or absence of particular types of transfers (nota-
bly family allowances), and some particular components of social expenditure
in countries in the "liberal" economic camp (e.g., old-age pensions in the
United States and Japan) are clearly not at all "residual." Social transfer pat-
terns are the outcome of historical processes within each society, and there are
considerable divergencies between countries in these processes from one type
of expenditure to another.
However, an important part of social expenditures comprises what might
broadly be called social insurance—coverage against particular risks for all
persons in a particular category.
7 Social insurance is often analyzed as an alter-
native to private insurance markets. Its advocates argue that social insurance
avoids the externalities inherent in private insurance markets (risk selection on
the part of providers, moral hazard on the part of consumers) through universal
provision (eliminating risk selection) and administrative controls (substituting
for private litigation to ensure the insurance contract is not undermined). This
perspective orients analysis toward the relative merits of universal public and
voluntary private provision in achieving the satisfactory mechanism for dealing
with individual risk.
In reviewing the relative merits of different systems of social protection
against risks, it is important to recognize that the contingencies individuals
might face are different on the Continent and in Japan than in Anglo-Saxon
countries. The law in most of the non-Anglo-Saxon countries specifies that
families are responsible for the upkeep of their indigent members. In English-
speaking countries, this obligation is confined to the nuclear family: the spouse
while the marriage is intact, children until age of majority (now generally 18).
In the case of children, the recent emphasis on child support has led to attempts
to enforce obligation on absent parents. But the obligation stops when children
reach maturity and is not reciprocal. It is possible to regard these responsibili-
ties as being absorbed into a production unit—the family—which is jointly
managed and responds as a unit to market signals. It is therefore possible to
envisage that such a unit should be able to manage its lifetime income stream
7. These categories can comprise all citizens (paying through taxation) but more usually com-
prise labor force participants who pay (or whose employers pay) compulsory levies.49 Trends in Social Protection Programs and Expenditures in the 1980s
and to assess social insurance arrangements in the light of alternative individ-
ual insurance arrangements and lifetime consumption patterns.
Elsewhere, however, the responsibility does not stop at the boundaries of the
nuclear household. The Napoleonic Code—which formalizes legal obligations
which existed previously and continues to influence contemporary legal codes
throughout Europe—refers to an obligation alimentaire: a legal responsibility
under which the obligation of parents to maintain their children is matched by
an obligation by adults to maintain their aged parents. In Germany and Austria,
this obligation goes further: children are jointly responsible for their indigent
grandparents, and parents are liable for the maintenance of their indigent adult
children. In Luxembourg, these responsibilities extend to further kin relation-
ships. Similar provisions exist in Japanese law and in the laws of most other
European countries—though they have been abolished in Nordic countries.
Historically, these responsibilities were exercised through cohabitation: the
extended family was an extended household, which operated as a unit. How-
ever, today this is only true in Japan, and even there cohabitation between gen-
erations is in decline (OECD 1994). It is difficult to reconcile mutual family
responsibility with separate living arrangements and personal autonomy. How
does an individual insure against parents becoming indigent or children (or
grandchildren) bankrupting themselves? The moral hazard and risk-shedding
features of such a market would be insuperable.
A concrete instance of such concerns is currently the subject of intense pub-
lic debate in Germany. Long-term care of the frail aged is not currently covered
by social insurance in that country, and the German government has committed
itself to extending statutory health insurance to cover this risk through a new
levy of 1.7 percent of "insurable" earnings, to be shared equally between the
insured and the employer. One of the authors of the law has noted that it is
being proposed in part because "becoming dependent on long-term care puts
the persons affected and their families in a precarious and often quite hopeless
financial position" (Vollmer 1993).
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2.3 Working Life Reduction
Social insurance evens out income over the lifetime, reducing disposable
incomes while in employment in order to ensure adequate incomes when not.
This carries the risk that the relative price of leisure (sometimes enforced
through layoffs) is reduced so much that significant withdrawal from the labor
force occurs—resulting in a narrowing of the base for employment levies,
forcing an increase in the rate of levy to keep budgetary balance, which in turn
reduces further the relative price of leisure... . This sort of process has brought
8. At the time of writing, actual passage of this measure is blocked through debate on how to
compensate employers for the cost of the levy: The government parties have proposed that pay-
ment for the first two days of sick leave should be dropped, but the unions oppose this.50 Peter Scherer
pension systems in a number of European countries (notably France) to a point
of crisis.
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A general symptom of this trend is the "leakage" of provision for old-age
income into working life. This has been happening in a number of countries
through public pension provisions. These generally provide for pensions for
those who become disabled during their working life, on similar terms to old-
age pensions. If ability to obtain employment is one of the criteria for assessing
disability, eligibility for disability pensions will increase during recessions.
This has happened in a number of countries. In general, the reduction in the
cost of leisure in old age through very high rates of earnings replacement raises
the individuals' perceived lifetime income and can lead to a desire to "spend"
some of this wealth earlier in life. It can and does also lead employers (and
unions) to single out those who are eligible for income support when layoffs
are necessary. As a result, average productive life in most OECD countries is
falling, as individuals (both males and females) leave the labor force earlier.
1
0
Public social protection systems thus suffer from some of the same risks of
moral hazard as workplace employment protection legislation: by driving a
wedge between income from employment and total labor costs, they can lead
to a level of overall employment lower than that implicitly assumed in their
design. Unless this issue is addressed with care, these systems can add to the
imbalances they were established to correct.
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the idea of social protection
is therefore unviable. Systems which emphasize labor force participation as a
condition for social protection are associated with low rates of poverty (how-
ever measured) before social transfers in a number of European countries (For-
ster 1994). Thus, the risk of reduction in labor force participation has to be set
against the encouragement of participation in order to take part in the system.
To the extent that lifetime wealth has been augmented as a result, use of part
of that wealth to consume more leisure should be welcomed, not condemned.
9. France has started to address this bias by shifting some of the burdens of financing social
protection expenditures from payroll taxes to a "general social contribution" (GSG) levied on all
incomes—including those of social security beneficiaries.
10. See OECD (1992b, 1994) for a further discussion of this trend and its causes.51 Trends in Social Protection Programs and Expenditures in the 1980s
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Fig. 2A.I Public Expenditure on Social Protection as a Percentage of GDP in
Other OECD Countries
Source: OECD 1994.
Note: OECD countries for which graphs are based on a mixture of old and new data from
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